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CHAPTER 8 
DUTCH AND ENGLISH APPROACHES TO CROSS-CULTURAL TRADE IN MUGHAL INDIA AND THE 
PROBLEM OF TRUST (CA 1600-1630)* 
Guido van Meersbergen 
 
Introduction 
 
The people of this country are generally faithless, without truth and honesty; exceeding subtle, 
covetous without mean or measure, never ceasing to beg and crave most basely, and 
impudently admitting to trade with us for fear and not for love; not to be gained by good usage 
nor any benefits; but their turns being once served the remembrance of it is straight forgotten.1 
I find the Mughals to be a nation whose word cannot be trusted, being highly experienced in the 
doctrine of Machiavelli. It is rare enough that they act in accordance with the king’s edict or 
farman, and without the king’s farman it is impossible to trade here, since the governors change 
annually and only seek to fill their pockets.2 
 
The above-cited statements offer a taste of the ethnographic language used by representatives of the 
Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) and East India Company (EIC) in Mughal India. These 
assertions, recorded by the English Captain Henry Pepwell and the Dutch senior merchant 
(opperkoopman) Pieter Gillis van Ravesteyn respectively, are drawn from a virtually endless stock of 
similar reflections on the presumed character of Asian people found in the archives of the East India 
Companies. Both Pepwell and Van Ravesteyn wrote down their impressions after a short stay in Surat, 
                                                          
* I would like to thank the editors of this volume and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on 
earlier drafts of this chapter. In addition, I gratefully acknowledge the input and support of my doctoral 
supervisors, Prof. Benjamin Kaplan and Prof. Stephen Conway. 
1 Henry Pepwell to Company, aboard the Charles, 7 March 1617: Frederick Charles Danvers and William Foster, 
eds., Letters Received by the East India Company from its Servants in the East. Transcribed from the ‘Original 
Correspondence’ Series of the India Office Records. 6 Vols. (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company, 1896-
1902), 5:157. 
2 ‘Ick bevinde de Mogullen een natie, die men haer woort niet en mach geloven, sijnde seer ervaren in de leere van 
Machiavel, ’t is qualick genoech, dat coninckx schrijft ofte firman naer comen ende sonder coninckx firman is ’t 
hier niet mogelijck te negotieeren, doordien de governeurs jaerlijckx veranderen, niet soeckende als haeren sack te 
vollen’: Remonstrance about the present state of Surat by Pieter Gillisz van Ravesteyn, 22 October 1615: H. 
Terpstra, De Opkomst der Westerkwartieren van de Oost-Indische Compagnie (Suratte, Arabië, Perzië) (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1918), 207-208. All translations are mine. 
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the principal port city of the Mughal Empire where the English opened a trading station in 1613 and the 
Dutch in 1616. The parallels between their experiences extended further. Like most Europeans engaged 
in global encounters during this period, Pepwell and Van Ravesteyn regarded their culturally different 
counterparts with varying degrees of suspicion, focusing their judgments on the issue of trustworthiness. 
Economic historians have directed much attention to the question of what enables individuals to 
trust one another with money or goods in situations where information is limited and coercive power to 
enforce agreements is wanting. The answer famously offered by Douglass North is that, throughout 
history, institutions have fulfilled the role of reducing uncertainty in exchange and ordering human 
interaction.3 A textbook example of such an institutional innovation is the joint-stock company. While 
North’s thesis provides a ready explanation of the flourishing of the East India Companies in terms of 
reduced transaction costs, its articulation of the problem of trust remains limited to principal-agent 
relations.4 Likewise, the work of Avner Greif did much to clarify the monitoring of agency relations 
within social or ethnic groups, yet tells us comparatively little about how trust functioned across cultural 
borders.5 If anything, the literature seems to suggest that cross-cultural trade was almost universally 
perceived as involving greater risks than trade relations based on kinship or ethnicity.6 As the East India 
Companies dealt almost exclusively with people who not only belonged to other political and legal 
entities but were also ethnically and religiously different, a fuller understanding of the implications of 
perceived otherness for such encounters is needed. 
This chapter focuses on ethnographic discourse as a means to explore the mentalities of 
commercial agents. It suggests that cultural assumptions, prejudice, and anxieties about outsiders were 
just as important in shaping VOC and EIC approaches to overseas trade as was economic rationality. Clad 
in hyperbole, Pepwell’s characterisation of Gujarat’s inhabitants outlines the three most potent 
stereotypes about Indian traders and government officials contained in seventeenth-century Company 
writing; namely that they were deceitful, avaricious, and more susceptible to force than to peaceful 
means. Given that such claims were interwoven into first-hand accounts, the extent to which they 
                                                          
3  Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990); Douglass C. North, “Institutions,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no.1 (1991): 97-112. 
4 Douglass C. North, “Institutions, Transaction Costs, and the Rise of Merchant Empires,” in The Political Economy 
of Merchant Empires: State Power and World Trade 1350-1750, ed. James D. Tracy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991),  22-40. 
5 Avner Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
6 Philip D. Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Janet Tai 
Landa, Trust, Ethnicity, and Identity: Beyond the New Institutional Economics of Ethnic Trading Networks, Contract 
Law, and Gift-Exchange (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994). 
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rested on received notions is often concealed. Van Ravesteyn’s assertion exemplifies this point. 
Ostensibly based on personal observation, his sociological explanation of the moral qualities of Mughal 
government – their lack of job-security induced office-holders to neglect the common good – in fact 
drew on the trope of Oriental despotism, in particular the notion that the emperor could arbitrarily 
dispose of all lands, goods, and persons.7 In addition, the generic reference to Machiavellianism served 
to reinforce his depiction of the Mughals as crafty, unscrupulous, and greedy. To dismiss such prose as 
merely rhetorical would be to overlook the profound influence of cultural discourse on the commercial 
strategies of the EIC and VOC. 
The Dutch and English presence in seventeenth-century Mughal India was characterised by 
three overlapping approaches to cross-cultural trade. In line with policies pursued throughout maritime 
Asia, the East India Companies primarily endeavoured to obtain trading concessions from Indian 
authorities through a mixture of political negotiation and gunboat diplomacy.8 Early commercial 
interactions in Gujarat convinced EIC and VOC representatives of the desirability of soliciting privileges 
directly from the emperor. Citing questionable moral character and the unreliability of agreements 
made with local governors in support of their standpoint, Van Ravesteyn and others argued that written 
imperial commands (farmans) offered the highest obtainable degree of security for Company goods and 
personnel. However, formal diplomacy in the manner of Sir Thomas Roe’s embassy to the court of 
Jahangir (1615-1618) proved extremely costly and only marginally successful. Furthermore, there were 
concerns about the efficacy of institutional arrangements with the central government, caused by 
doubts about its effective degree of control over officials in coastal Gujarat.9 As the practical limitations 
of imperial farmans became clear during recurrent disputes with Mughal administrators, Company 
agents increasingly suggested alternative strategies. A sizeable number of Dutch and English factors in 
Surat and elsewhere continued to call for the periodic use of naval force to complement diplomacy. In 
addition, a less conspicuous informal approach based on reaching accommodations with individual 
                                                          
7 See Joan-Pau Rubiés, “Oriental Despotism and European Orientalism: Botero to Montesquieu,” Journal of Early 
Modern History 9, no. 2 (2005): 109-180. 
8 See also: Adam Clulow, “European Maritime Violence and Territorial States in Early Modern Asia, 1600-1650,” 
Itinerario 33, no. 3 (2009): 72-94.  
9 Local governors were said to rule “as if they were kings themselves” (“off self coningen waeren”): W. Ph. 
Coolhaas, ed., Pieter van den Broecke in Azië. 2 Vols. (The Hague: Linschoten Vereeniging, 1962-1963), II:383. See 
also the remark that “The Governour of Suratt breaketh his promises and playeth rex with our people and 
busines.” Thomas Rastell et al. to Company, Surat, 7 November 1621: William Foster, ed., The English Factories in 
India 1618-1621 [to] 1668-1669. A Calendar of Documents in the India Office, British Museum and Public Record 
Office. 13 Vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906-1927), I:323. (Hereafter EFI). 
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Mughal officials based on mutual benefit gradually emerged as the preferred mode of cross-cultural 
interaction for many agents on the ground.10 
As this chapter seeks to demonstrate, ethnographic assumptions about Indian people and 
cultural notions of trust played a defining role in shaping each of these three lines of action. Before 
taking up the analysis of Dutch and English approaches to cross-cultural contact in Gujarat in the spheres 
of trade and politics respectively, the following section will briefly draw attention to the formative 
influence of previous experiences of extra-European encounter. 
 
 
Preliminary Encounters 
 
The attitudes displayed by the first generation of EIC and VOC agents in Mughal India is reminiscent of 
earlier responses to overseas encounter found in the vast literature of European travel writing. One 
observation about accounts of inter-oceanic voyages is that they are revealing of the degree of violence 
that characterised cross-cultural commerce. Not surprisingly, this antagonistic reality amplified the 
suspicion which accompanied dealings between strangers. The mindset betrayed by many narratives of 
encounter corresponds to what James Tracy called “the psychology of an interloper,” namely the 
manifestation of “anxieties that were proportional to the fragility of their own position in a vast and 
alien world.”11 Apprehension was fuelled by ignorance about the inhabitants of little-known regions. 
Such was the case in 1595 on the first Dutch voyage to Asia, when none of the crew members dared to 
land at the Cape of Good Hope out of fear that “those African savages would have beaten us to death, 
even eaten us.”12 Nonetheless, precaution was not unwarranted as fatal confrontations were far from 
uncommon. The ill-fated decision of the English trader William Bats to go on shore at Cape Verde 
unarmed may stand as an example. 
  This episode, which took place in 1566, is related in Richard Hakluyt’s Principal Navigations as 
follows: “by the counsel of William Bats both Captaine and marchants and divers of the companie went 
                                                          
10 See also: Farhat Hasan, “Conflict and Cooperation in Anglo-Mughal Trade Relations during the Reign of 
Aurangzeb,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 34, no. 4 (1991), 351-360. 
11 James D. Tracy, “Introduction,” in ed. Tracy, The Political Economy of Merchant Empires, 1-21, at 9, 13. 
12 “dat ons die Africaense wilden souden doot geslaeghen, jae opgegeeten hebben.”: J.K.J. de Jonge, ed., De 
Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag in Oost-Indië, 1595-1610: Verzameling van onuitgegeven stukken uit het 
Oud-Koloniaal Archief. 13 Vols. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1862-1888), II:299. 
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without armour: for he sayd, that although the people were blacke and naked, yet they were civell.”13 
Bats’ reasoning that the Cape Verdians were “civil” and therefore could be trusted was dismissed by 
Hakluyt as “foolish rashnes.”14 Although the editor’s comment was made after the small landing party 
was ambushed and almost wiped out, it reflects the widespread assumption that danger and deceit 
should always be expected a priori. Similar sentiments were expressed in an early EIC advice about 
cross-cultural dealings: “take heede you come not within their daunger, still expecting & feareing evill 
though there be noe cause.”15 Likewise, before setting out to the East Indies, Dutch Captain Cornelis de 
Houtman was instructed not to trust locals nor allow them to carry weaponry on board to prevent being 
overpowered.16 Ironically the latter was exactly what happened in September 1599 in Aceh, causing 
Cornelis’ death and the imprisonment of his brother Frederik. The record of comparable occurrences is 
long, and although one could with even greater ease compile a list of atrocities committed by Europeans, 
in the event of collisions the presumed “treachery” of non-Europeans was usually held responsible. 
Besides resembling descriptions of encounters taking place prior to the commencement of EIC 
and VOC trade in India, the distrustful portrayals of Indians recorded in the first phase of Company 
activity also echo ethnographic ideas generated elsewhere in Asia. When Pieter van den Broecke visited 
the Arabian Peninsula in 1614, he noted about the bania traders in Shihr that “these banias are very 
treacherous and cunning, so that I truly want to have warned about them.”17 This judgment prefigured 
Van den Broecke’s long-term engagement with Gujarat and as such emphasises the importance of pre-
obtained ideas in setting the scene for future encounters. Intentionally or not, his depiction dovetailed 
neatly with sixteenth-century characterisations of banias as “very ready to deceiue” and “great liars” by 
the Dutch traveller Jan Huygen van Linschoten and the Portuguese factor Duarte Barbosa respectively.18 
Strikingly similar denouncements are found in different contexts across the Indian Ocean world. To 
name only two examples: EIC agent Edmund Scott wrote from Java that “[t]he Chyneses are very craftie 
                                                          
13 Richard Hakluyt, The Principal Navigations Voyages Traffiques & Discoveries of the English Nation. 12 vols. (New 
York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1969), VI:270. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Commission Third Voyage, 9 March 1607: George Birdwood, ed., The Register of Letters &c. of the Governour 
and Company of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies: 1600-1619 (London: Bernard Quaritch, 1893), 
117. 
16 “betraut u op de innewoners des lantz niet, noch laetende deselve met geen gewere aen boort commen, opdat 
ghy in u schepen niet overweldicht wordt.” Instructions to Cornelis de Houtman, March 1598: W.S. Unger, ed., De 
Oudste Reizen van de Zeeuwen naar Oost-Indië 1598-1604 (The Hague: Linschoten Vereeniging, 1948), 32. 
17 “dese banjannen sijn hier zeer bedriechelijck en durtrapt, soodat ick zeer voor haar gewarschoudt wil hebben.” 
Coolhaas, Pieter van den Broecke 1:45. 
18 John Huigen van Linschoten, His Discours of Voyages into ye Easte & West Indies (London: John Wolfe, 1598), 71; 
Mansel Longworth Dames, ed., The Book of Duarte Barbosa: An Account of the countries bordering to the Indian 
Ocean and their inhabitants 2 vols. (London: Hakluyt Society, 1918-1921), 1: 112. 
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people in trading, using all kind of cosoning and deceit which may possible be devised,”19 while Captain 
Nicholas Downton when anchoring near Mocha (al-Mukha) declared that “there is no faithful 
performance to be expected from these truthless Turks.”20 
Whilst ardently scrutinising others, Company agents were not unaware that the reverse was 
true as well. In determining their actions they habitually considered how these might come across to 
others, even though the manner in which they envisioned this depended on their own perceptions. 
Regarding attempts to trade with the Islamic Governor of Mohéli, one of the Comoro Islands, Joris van 
Spilbergen remarked that it was important for the Dutch to show signs of good intentions, “because the 
Turks and Moors have the nature of Jews, [namely] that they do not trust easily.”21 Turning the usual 
suspicion inside out and projecting it onto the other party, Spilbergen arrived at a mirrored 
representation. If an opinion about the trustworthiness of Muslims and Jews remained unstated here, 
Spilbergen’s published account from 1605 featured a copperplate accompanied by a verse which 
warned that non-Christians should not be trusted.22 The equation of Muslims with Jews underlines that 
concrete experiences with specific groups overlapped with ideas about other people who were regarded 
as sharing a similar degree of otherness, thereby increasing the general sense of distrust about others 
which impregnated the discourses of Company agents and guided their actions. 
Economic and anthropological studies assert that familiar identities are commonly treated as a 
proxy for a trading partner’s trustworthiness, which explains the importance of particularistic exchange 
relations along kinship or ethnic lines. Rituals and insignia that help to determine group identity are 
consequently seen as crucial signalling devices.23 What is needed for our purposes is to consider how the 
problem of distrust was overcome between culturally different trading partners. As Philip D. Curtin 
pointed out, unfamiliar customs appear as unpredictable and therefore threatening to foreign 
                                                          
19 Edmund Scott, An Exact Discourse of the Subtilties, Fashions, Pollicies, Religion, and Ceremonies of the East 
Indians, as well Chyneses as Javans, there abyding and dwelling (London: Walter Burre, 1606), in William Foster, 
ed., The Voyage of Sir Henry Middleton to the Moluccas 1604-1606 (London: Hakluyt Society, 1943), 174. 
20 Nicholas Downton to Henry Middleton in Mocha, aboard the Darling, 17 March 1610/11: Letters Received I: 63. 
21 “want de Turcken ende Mooren hebben den aert vande Ioden datse niet geerne vertrouwen.“ F.W. Wieder, et 
al., eds., De Reis van Joris van Spilbergen naar Ceylon, Atjeh en Bantam, 1601-1604 (The Hague: Linschoten 
Vereeniging, 1933), 28. 
22 “T’onchristen geslacht (wilt)/ niet te veel betrouwen/ want door hun onverstant/ compt men by haer in 
rouwen.” Ibid., 3. The copperplate depicts an incident in which Spilbergen and his crew were attacked by 
indigenous people off the West-African coast. 
23 Landa, Trust, Ethnicity, and Identity, ix-xiii, 133-135. Note that economic experiments indicate that people 
preferentially trust similar-looking partners: Karl Sigmund, “Sympathy and Similarity: The Evolutionary Dynamics of 
Cooperation,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 106, no.21 (2009): 
8405-8406. 
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onlookers.24 More recently, Harry Liebersohn emphasised that the stranger two cultures are to one 
another, the greater is the importance of symbolic acts, in particular gift giving.25 It follows that a 
climate for trust could be created once a common ground in which signs and rituals have shared 
meanings had been established.26 Practically every account of cross-cultural interaction described the 
documents and speeches that were exchanged during the first meeting, the material objects and 
foodstuffs presented and received, and the honorific ceremonies performed. Signs of hospitality and 
goodwill and reciprocity of gift exchange appear to have been the most effective means of creating an 
impression of trustworthiness.27 When both sides understood the aforementioned rituals as codes of 
polite and peaceful interaction, their repeated performance created routines of communication which 
rendered expectations about behaviour more predictable.28 
Knowledge about successful previous encounters provided an additional stimulus to trust. Take, 
for instance, the Portuguese traveller Duarte Lopes, who from the record of peaceful interactions 
between his compatriots and the inhabitants of Malindi on the East-African coast deduced that: “[a]s a 
rule, the people are friendly, truthful, and familiar with strangers.”29 Their reputation for reliability 
(truthfulness) was incorporated into the geographical works of Linschoten and John Pory, who 
embedded Lopes’s positive characterisation of Malindi’s inhabitants in a discussion of their social 
condition, mentioning housing, dress, and wealth. “In briefe,” Pory concluded, apparently implying a 
connection between such societal attributes and moral character, “the inhabitants are a kind, true-
harted, & trustie people.”30 This example confirms two important points: evaluations of a foreign society 
as a whole had bearing on the reputation of its individual members, and those characteristics that 
corresponded to European norms of civility led to estimations which impacted positively on trust.31 
                                                          
24 Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade, 1. 
25 Harry Liebersohn, The Return of the Gift: European History of a Global Idea (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), 6. 
26 Insights from game-theory suggest that the meaning of signals is entirely based on convention: Brian Skyrms, 
Signals: Evolution, Learning, & Information (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1-7.  
27 Michael Harbsmeier, “Gifts and Discoveries: Gift Exchange in Early Modern Narratives of Exploration and 
Discovery,” in Negotiating the Gift: Pre-Modern Figurations of Exchange, eds. Gadi Algazi, Valentin Groebner and 
Bernhard Jussen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003), 381-410. 
28 See also: Francesca Trivellato, The Familiarity of Strangers: The Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno, and Cross-Cultural 
Trade in the Early Modern Period (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). 
29 A Report of the Kingdom of Congo, and of the Surrounding Countries; Drawn out of the Writings and Discourses 
of the Portuguese, Duarte Lopez, By Filippo Pigafetta, in Rome, 1591, trans. Margarite Hutchinson (London: John 
Murray, 1881), 123. 
30 A Geographical Historie of Africa, Written in Arabicke and Italian by Iohn Leo a More, borne in Granada, and 
brought up in Barbarie, trans. John Pory (London: George Bishop, 1600), 28; Discours of Voyages, 213.  
31 About norms of civility: Joan-Pau Rubiés, Travel and Ethnology in the Renaissance: South India through European 
Eyes, 1250-1625 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 111-117; Ernst van den Boogaart, “Colour 
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Commercial Interactions 
 
Practically all business in early modern Gujarati port towns was conducted through the intermediation 
of brokers, as few European observers failed to point out.32 One of the fullest descriptions of this 
practice is provided by the sixteenth-century Venetian traveller Cesare Federici, who reported that in 
Cambay trade was handled by “certain Brokers which are Gentiles and of great authority.”33 Upon a 
merchant’s arrival on shore one of these brokers took charge of all goods and ordered his servants to 
unload them, pay custom charges, and carry the merchandise into the lodgings reserved for its owner. 
All of this took place, Federici asserts, with “The Marchant not knowing any thing thereof, neither 
custome, nor charges.”34 In Federici’s account this appeared like the ideal settlement: the foreign 
merchant had nothing to worry about besides the decision whether or not to sell and buy against the 
prevailing price, and the broker was guaranteed of the exclusive right to transact on the merchant’s 
behalf. However, for this practice to work it was crucial that the merchant trusted that his broker would 
not cheat him, which added to the risks that accompanied selling on credit. This factor complicated the 
picture painted by Federici and caused many of the real or imagined difficulties which Company 
employees ran into.  
The earliest documented dispute involving sale on credit by the EIC occurred in 1609, when 
Muqarrab Khan, mutasaddi (town governor) of Surat, bought a cargo of lead from the English factor 
William Finch and arranged for the merchant-broker Tapidas Parekh to reimburse the sum of 15,000 
mahmudis. Following news that a ship which Tapidas owned had been seized by the Portuguese and 
wrecked near Goa, the broker was imprisoned by Surat’s authorities on account of outstanding debts.35 
His house and goods were seized upon to pay his creditors, of whom the EIC was just one. To make 
matters worse, Tapidas’ associate fled Surat to escape payment claims. In a letter to Captain William 
Hawkins, Finch admitted that the full sum would not be recovered, yet stressed in his defence that: “If 
you shall think it very indiscreetly done by me to trust him, I would have your Worship to take notice, 
that as then no man in the city mistrusted or once dreamed of so strange an accident.”36 Finch’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Prejudice and the Yardstick of Civility: The Initial Dutch Confrontation with Black Africans, 1590-1635,” in Racism 
and Colonialism, ed. Robert Ross (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 1982), 33-54. 
32 D.W. Caland, ed., De Remonstrantie van W. Geleynssen de Jongh (The Hague: Linschoten Vereeniging, 1929), 9-
10. See also: Michael N. Pearson, “Brokers in Western Indian Ocean Port Cities Their Role in Servicing Foreign 
Merchants,” Modern Asian Studies 22, no. 3 (1988): 455-472. 
33 Hakluyt, Principal Navigations, 5:375. 
34 Ibid., 376. 
35 William Foster, ed., Early Travels in India 1583-1619 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1921), 131. 
36 William Finch to William Hawkins, Surat, 12 July 1609: Letters Received I: 25. 
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explanation suggests that a reputation mechanism based on available information about Tapidas’ past 
conduct had encouraged him to trust the broker, and according to economic theory this experience 
would rule out future transactions with this individual.37 However, the conclusion Finch drew from the 
incident had bearing on the collective, given that he regarded it as a proof of “the villainy of these 
people and the little confidence that ought to be reposed in them,” and resolved that it was to serve as 
“a warning to me for ever trusting more whilst I am in Surat.”38 
Finch’s exclamation was matched by countless contemporary statements expressing similar 
sentiments, underlining that fierce mistrust and prejudice about cultural others was a dominant and 
stable feature of EIC and VOC correspondence. One could quote the belief of the EIC factors in Surat 
that “[t]here is no trust to the promises of Moors if the performance tend not to their profit,”39 Van den 
Broecke’s statement that “one may not belief nor trust the words of Moors,”40 or the assertion of two 
Englishmen in Cambay that little credence should be given to their Indian brokers: “wee knowe they are 
men that have little faith, troth, nor honesty, and this our opinion of them that they practize nothinge 
more then to cozen us and gett our monny.”41 John Browne revealed his discomfort when trading in the 
Indian marketplace, ruled as it was by unfamiliar customs that to him appeared counterproductive to 
trust: “We are here never sure of any bargain till we have it in our hands; custom here (though an ill one) 
giveth advantage to make a shameless retreat from their words.”42 Finally, Van Ravesteyn warned his 
countrymen against supplying merchandise to Indians without receiving prior payment, claiming that 
“these nations are not to be trusted, and even if they have agreed on a price, once the goods are in their 
possession they will give whatever they want.”43 Persistent misgivings about the trustworthiness of 
Indian brokers notwithstanding, the Companies could not do business without them. This predicament 
was acknowledged in an instruction issued to the Dutch Surat factors in 1632, which explicitly ordered 
                                                          
37 On reputation mechanisms: Greif, Institutions, 58-59, 62-71. 
38 William Finch to William Hawkins, Surat, 12 July 1609: Letters Received, 1:25. Note that, despite these 
inauspicious beginnings, Tapidas and his kinsmen continued to work with the EIC throughout the seventeenth 
century: Makrand Mehta, Indian Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Historical Perspective (Delhi: Academic 
Foundation, 1991), 65-90. 
39 Surat Factors to Thomas Roe, Surat, 23 July 1616: Letters Received, 4:323. 
40 “dat men de mooren woorden geen gelooff geven mach noch vertrouwen.” Dutch National Archives, The Hague 
(hereafter NL-HaNA) 1.04.02 (VOC), inv. no. 1084: Pieter van den Broecke to Batavia, Surat, 22 April 1625, f. 48r. 
41 Joseph Salbank and Richard Lancaster to Surat, Cambay, 27 November 1621: EFI 1618-1621, 344. 
42 John Browne to Company, Swally, 10 February 1617: Letters Received, 5:76. 
43 ‘alsoo dese natien niet en sijn te betrouwen, ende al is ’t schoon dat se prijs hebben gemaeckt, als ’t goet wech 
hebben, geven daer naer wat selver willen’: Terpstra, Westerkwartieren, 215. 
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them to continue to buy through local middlemen because the latter possessed superior knowledge of 
the market.44 
One method through which he EIC sought to ensure the loyalty of their brokers was by moving 
them away from their native environment, which was intended to make them more fully reliant on the 
Company and less free to pursue their own agenda.45 Another preferred strategy was to engage in long-
term dealings with the same individual or family network, thus increasing predictability and building up 
understandings based on mutual advantage. If relatively steady commercial relationships with some 
Indians took shape through these means, this did little to alleviate group prejudice. Thus, in 1617 the 
English factors in Surat acknowledged that their broker had proven his endeavours on behalf of the EIC, 
but retained their judgment that “otherwise he differeth not from the rest of his profession, base, 
disordered and deceitful.”46 In the absence of stable business connections, the decision which broker to 
confide in ultimately depended on personal judgment. The advice which Richard Cocks gave to a fellow 
factor in Japan expressed this position clearly. According to Cocks, it was better to entrust Asian 
intermediaries with goods than to sell no goods at all, provided that they were reputable: “you may 
trust men which you know are to be trusted. For though I advise you not to trust the Company’s goods 
without ready payment, yet that is to be understood such as are not to be trusted.”47 Unsurprisingly, 
finding this delicate balance proved too subtle for many Company agents, the majority of whom never 
quite shook off the fear of being cheated. 
Commercial interactions also had a second, official, side to them. In Surat the two principal 
office-holders exerting control over trade matters were the mutasaddi and the shahbandar (harbour 
master), who were in charge of civic administration and the customs house, respectively.48 Goods could 
not be cleared before their price was fixed, tolls were paid, and a stamp of approval was received. 
Moreover, permission was required for ships to load or unload and for persons to come upon shore.49 
Consequently, the mutasaddi was in a position to impose terms on the Companies and, if wishing to do 
so, impede their trade, although he could not act with impunity. Complaints from the merchant 
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community repeatedly led to the dismissal of port town governors, yet this check on their power hardly 
altered the image conveyed by Dutch and English accounts, which are filled with allegations of arbitrary 
use of power and the breaking of promises. 50 
Before the English had even settled in Surat, Nicholas Downtown ascribed the difficulties which 
the EIC experienced to the excess of confidence that was put in “the show of welcome made by this 
dissembling and faithless people,” voicing his frustration at what he considered as the deceptive political 
manoeuvring and “fickle favour” of the Mughal authorities.51 Dutch views regarding local government in 
Surat neatly resembled those of their English colleagues.52 We already noted Van Ravesteyn’s argument 
that trade without imperial license was impossible because of “the untrustworthiness of this nation,” to 
which he added that even farmans hardly restrained the rapacious conduct of local governors.53 Like 
Francisco Pelsaert a decade later, Van Ravesteyn told his superiors that Mughal office-holders used 
every means to amass income at the expense of the commonwealth, motivated thereto by uncertainty 
of maintaining their administration.54  He also believed that the VOC faced a more immediate 
consequence from the rotation of office-holders, which had direct bearing on the problem of trust. 
Namely that decrees issued by sitting governors could not be depended upon because they were 
frequently disregarded by their successors.55 
While soliciting imperial farmans remained a principal strategy aim, Company agents stationed 
in India increasingly recommended informal strategies which complemented, or provided alternatives to, 
institutional arrangements. The Dutch authors of the “Cordt relaes” (ca. 1617-1620) remarked that 
import and export duties were negotiable as long as one cultivated a good relationship with the officers 
of the custom house.56 Furthermore, rather than spending lavishly on an official embassy, they 
recommended acquiring the assistance of a Mughal courtier to act as the VOC’s solicitor. To ensure his 
or her continuous patronage it was essential to sustain personal relations, to which end periodic gifts in 
cash or kind were advisable.57 Alternatively, Wouter Heuten and his co-authors suggested the brokerage 
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of individuals such as Abraham de Duits, an Antwerp jeweller employed at Jahangir’s court who was said 
to possess intimate knowledge of local culture and customs.58  
EIC and VOC representatives universally agreed that gifts were essential to gain favour with 
influential persons in the imperial administration and smooth the process of social and political 
communication. Experience in dealing with Mughal officials taught them which items were in demand 
and they defined their gift-giving strategies accordingly. Thomas Kerridge asserted that “[t]hings best for 
presents generally with all the people of these countries are novelties and things of little worth,”59 while 
Heuten advised that “presents should not be expensive but artful.”60 Both descriptions implied exotic 
curiosities that would appeal to the so-called “curious” nature of the inhabitants of Mughal India.61 
Again we see that cultural assumptions about Indian people were influential in determining Dutch and 
English approaches to cross-cultural exchange, as likewise they were in conditioning the manner in 
which encounters were perceived. Pepwell’s complaint that “their turns being once served the 
remembrance of it is straight forgotten” was only one of many truisms employed to illustrate the 
alleged fickleness of Indians.62 It served to support his argument that neither material benefits nor 
agreements based on mutual understanding sufficed to bind local traders and functionaries to the 
English, which seriously compromised their reliability as partners. The distrustful attitude which 
permeates testimonies of commercial interactions also informed approaches to political and diplomatic 
dealings, and constituted an important factor in justifying the use of naval aggression by the Dutch and 
English Companies. 
 
 
Accommodation and Conflict 
 
In 1615 the EIC made their most impressive bid at securing an imperial farman when King James I was 
persuaded to send a royal ambassador to the Mughal court.63 As a diplomatic assignment with royal 
authorisation aimed at establishing official relations, Thomas Roe’s embassy was an archetypal 
institutional undertaking aimed at creating formal arrangements to safeguard the legal status of English 
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trade in Mughal domains. However, reality proved more haphazard and English hopes and expectations 
were repeatedly thwarted. Exasperated by his failure to obtain the desired document, Roe wrote to the 
English ambassador in Constantinople that Jahangir was not willing to bind himself upon terms of 
reciprocity, but only permitted the EIC to stay for the duration of his favour. Consequently, no general 
license but only restricted permits were forthcoming, “and those revocable at pleasure and subject to 
daily alterations.”64 After having spent more than two years at Jahangir’s court, Roe advised the 
Company that the idea of procuring permanent capitulations should be discarded: “All the government 
depends on the present will, where appetite only governs the lords of the kingdome.”65 On the eve of 
his departure, Roe was at last granted the long-awaited articles by Prince Khurram, who acted as 
subahdar (provincial governor) of Gujarat. The ink on this document was hardly dry when the English 
factors resumed their complaints that the Mughal officials in Surat only respected those stipulations 
that accorded with their personal opinions.66 
 Frustrated by the protracted nature of dealings at the Mughal court, the seemingly limited 
assurance of formal agreements, and the recurring disputes at the local level, employees of both 
Companies increasingly advocated the use of maritime power. Justifications of naval display were 
supported by conjectures about the character of the people at whom they were aimed, emphasising 
their supposed dishonesty, susceptibility to force, and haughtiness. Thomas Kerridge stated that the 
arrival of English ships in Surat would serve to “affright this people whom nothing but fear will make 
honest,” and Wouter Heuten suggested that the presence of a Dutch fleet was desirable “to gain some 
esteem with these arrogant Moors.”67 The idea that remedies for perceived abuses were more readily 
obtained by arresting native shipping than by seeking formal redress was a strong current in European 
activity all over India as well as beyond.68 In 1620, the EIC agents in Surat explicitly used ethnological 
assumptions to endorse such forceful action: “The inborne cunning of the people of India is incredible. 
The abuse of the Guzerates will not be remidyed but by one meanes only, namely, by deteyning their 
junckes.”69  
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This policy led to the first significant break in Anglo-Mughal and Mughal-Dutch relations. In 
September 1621, the Dutch ships Sampson and Weesp attacked six Indian vessels in the Red Sea, 
thereby violating the passes of safe conduct granted by the Dutch chief factor in Mocha, Willem de 
Milde. Although in line with orders to arrest ships which belonged to Portuguese allies or which 
transported Portuguese goods, this rash undertaking was unjustifiable even by VOC standards and 
caused a serious outcry. In the aftermath of this event, De Milde was imprisoned in Yemen and the 
VOC’s personnel in Surat put under house arrest by the local authorities.70 Likewise in 1621, EIC ships 
detained a large vessel owned by Prince Khurram in an attempt to put pressure on Surat’s officials. 
Mughal repercussions revealed the immense imbalance between European ascendancy at sea and 
vulnerability on the mainland. EIC activity in Surat, Agra, Ahmadabad, and Cambay was brought to a halt 
and English goods were seized, while English merchants suffered imprisonment in Agra and Surat. On 
their part, the EIC captured a total of eight Indian ships and kept its crews and passengers hostage. A 
final settlement with Surat’s government was reached in September 1624, after which President 
Thomas Rastell informed the Company that a more peaceful line of action would henceforth be 
advisable.71 
 With this change of direction the English factors adopted a stance which the Dutch chief in Surat, 
Pieter van den Broecke, had been promoting for some time. His deployment of a language of honour 
and prestige is telling about the ways in which Company agents imagined they could acquire a 
reputation for credibility with local merchants and authorities. Upon hearing of the actions of the Weesp 
and Sampson, Van den Broecke lamented that the VOC’s reputation had been blemished for the whole 
world to see by an act that went against “the nature of our pious Batavians,” and feared that as a result 
“our honest name of word-keeping people will remain obscured.”72 If the VOC wished to continue to 
trade in Surat, he pleaded in 1624, it would be necessary to deal “more civilly” with the inhabitants. 
Counter to a deep-seated discourse, he argued that friendship would accomplish more than force. 
Following a practice which the EIC had already begun to implement, Van den Broecke suggested that the 
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ideal way for the Dutch to ingratiate themselves and restore credit was to freight Indian-owned goods 
on Company ships going to Persia and the Red Sea ports.73  
Transporting Indian goods was a means to utilise otherwise unused space, but it also offered a 
loophole for private traders to transport goods on the account of Asian merchants, especially since 
influential persons such as Surat’s shahbandar and the so-called merchant-prince Virji Vohra were 
exempted from paying freight costs by the VOC. In defiance of an official prohibition issued by 
Governor-General Jan Pieterszoon Coen in 1629, the Dutch factors in Surat continued to transport 
Indian goods on freight.74 Their decision was realistic considering the demands of their position, which 
required them to steer a course between corporate interests and local logics and codes. Since the VOC 
had to borrow large sums of money from local merchants to finance their trade in Gujarat, the Dutch 
factors knew they could not afford to alienate them. Representing an often obscure power, Company 
employees had to make the most of their abilities to build up personal networks and attain social status 
in Indian commercial and political society. The very nature of a commercial enterprise covering vast 
geographical expanses tied together by slow communication lines accounted for a certain degree of 
autonomy for agents on the ground, and an expectation to adapt policy directives to local circumstances 
was implied in many instructions.75 What directors were unequivocal about, however, was that the 
modes that were adopted should be befitting merchants, in other words: cost-efficient. 
 This position is reflected in the instructions given to Jan van Hasel in 1628 upon succeeding Van 
den Broecke as head of Dutch trade in Surat. Coen criticised the habit of VOC officials to incur great 
costs for pomp and ostentation in order to “seek honour and reputation with the Moors.” He believed 
that expenses could be diminished by two thirds, mainly by cutting down on excesses in the 
maintenance of large retinues consisting of native servants and horses.76 Coen’s reprimand is revealing 
of the representational strategies used by VOC agents in Mughal India, which were intended to mimic 
the ceremonial language through which local elites expressed their power and standing. Describing his 
visit to Surat in 1623, the Italian traveller Pietro Della Valle asserted that the chief English and Dutch 
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officials “live in sufficient splendor and after the manner of the greatest persons of the Country.”77 Their 
use of flags, banners, horsemen, armed foot soldiers, and typically Asian status symbols such as 
palanquins and peacock-feather fans, signals the willingness of European Company agents in India to 
adapt to local norms. 
By the end of the 1620s, despite the enduring influence of cultural prejudice and distrust, there 
were various individuals on both sides of the encounter who displayed the flexibility required for 
effective cross-cultural dealings. Wollebrant Geleynssen de Jongh, whose prolonged stay in Gujarat 
made him a well-placed adviser, suggested that to win the favour of Mughal governors it was imperative 
to “accommodate oneself to his humours,” which could be achieved by visiting him often and spending 
time in his company, by presenting him with liquors, or going out hunting together.78 In similar fashion, 
President Kerridge and his Council assured their directors in 1628 that they strove to preserve social 
contacts with Surat’s elites, “which by often visiting, presents, and invitacions we have obtained in an 
unwonted measure.”79 The personal networks built up through these means benefitted Company trade 
greatly, and few individuals had a better grasp of the value of this social capital than Van den Broecke. 
Upon his final departure from Surat he went around town to take his leave from the principal merchants 
and government officials, while making sure to introduce Van Hasel in a stylised attempt to transmit the 
goodwill and relationships he had built up in more than a decade unto his successor.80 While such 
accommodations did not prevent future breaches of relations, they probably kept them from occurring 
as frequently as they otherwise might have.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the opening decades of the seventeenth century and beyond, ethnological assumptions, cultural 
stereotypes, and distrust were central to the strategies of Dutch and English East India Company agents 
for dealings with their Asian counterparts. It has been possible to speak of the VOC and EIC jointly as 
“the Companies” within the context of this chapter because both their written discourses and their 
policies regarding trade in Northwest-India displayed striking similarities. Most of the cited sources dealt 
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with Muslims, who constituted the majority among Mughal elites, yet references to bania merchants 
show that accusations of untrustworthiness were not reserved for a single group. Quite the contrary, 
descriptions of dissembling, greedy, and inconstant people are found in accounts written by Company 
servants in all parts of Asia. To a certain degree, proximity could serve to familiarise the other and create 
the mutuality conducive to social exchange and trust. This becomes more fully visible in the later 
seventeenth century, when brokerage relations and communications with Indian officials had become 
more firmly entrenched as a normative part of Company agents’ daily routine. Still it should be stressed 
that cultural suspicion continued to be a dominant feature of Dutch and English discourses and that 
individual bonds of trust did not efface negative group stereotypes. Hence, cultural preconceptions 
remained a crucial factor alongside a person’s reputation based on past performance in determining the 
degree of trust placed in them. 
The lasting significance of such intangible matters as cultural understanding, honour, and 
prejudice for Company attitudes demonstrates that to account for the complex factors that shaped 
cross-cultural interaction solely in terms of institutional arrangements is insufficient. Although the 
Companies looked towards institutions for legal protection of their persons and goods, access to courts 
of justice or the possession of written agreements did not suffice to solve the problem of trust. As we 
have seen, employees of the Dutch and English Companies drew upon a variety of informal methods to 
negotiate economic and political relations with Indian merchants and magistrates, which functioned in 
conjunction with the corporate deployment of official diplomacy and maritime force. Agents with 
knowledge of local customs and languages, or intermediaries capable of adapting to foreign etiquette, 
played a key role in making or breaking the precarious relations between the Companies and local elites, 
as well as in upholding the reputation of the trading group they represented. Given that cross-cultural 
commerce ultimately took shape through interpersonal relations on the ground, it is evident that the 
accommodative strategies of individual Company agents and their Indian counterparts were 
indispensable in enabling the framework nominally erected through formal agreements to function in 
practice. 
It is hoped that this contribution has revealed that our comprehension of VOC and EIC 
involvement in Asian trade is greatly enriched when approaching it not primarily from the perspective of 
monopolies, profit margins, and protection costs, but through a focus on the experiences and 
mentalities of the individuals who forged cross-cultural links on the level of face-to-face contact. Further 
research needs to ask how local perceptions of Europeans mediated commercial intercourse and 
influenced cross-cultural trust from the South Asian point of view. Initial investigations suggest that, as 
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the mirror image of the European idea of Indian treachery, enmity and the notion of “Frankish deceit” 
were likewise present in South and Southeast Asian accounts. 81 Additional work in this field is likely to 
shed more light on the crucial role of cultural (mis)understanding and mutual suspicion in establishing 
viable means of operating between strangers. 
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